Introduction
The Dow Fire and Explosion Index was developed by the Dow Chemical Company in the 1960's as a tool for plant engineers to give relative value to the risk of individual process unit losses due to potential fires and explosions and to communicate these risk to management in terms easily understood, i.e. potential of financial losses due to lost production and damage to plant facilities. The index is still widely used, and has been upgraded seven times. This index estimates the hazards of a single process unit based on chemical properties and inventories, and then use plant construction cost or replacement cost to estimate the potential risk in dollar terms. The aim of this communication is to develop an index, which is a measure of risk and takes into account risk reduction measures implemented or proposed for the plant unit, such as process control systems, material isolation systems and fire protection systems. Thus as the F&EI rates the hazards, the proposed extension rates the risk.
Dow's Fire & Explosion Index Procedure
Based on their in house experiences with fires and explosions during the late fifties and early sixties the Dow Chemical Company developed their fire and explosion index (F&EI) as a tool to rate the hazard from a fire or explosion at their world wide facilities on a uniform scale. Over the years the index has been adjusted based on both internal and external data as well as qualitative and quantitative analysis. The aim of this tool is to communicate the loss potential to management in such a way, that management may take appropriate actions to reduce the loss potential. The aim is not to rate a given facility as safe or unsafe, but to give a relative ranking of hazards within an organization. The current version of the guide is available from AIChE (1994) , and is referred to as the F&EI Guide in the remainder of this communication. The general procedure for using the F&EI Guide is shown in figure 1 , and involve the following steps:
1. A material factor -MF -which is a measure of the reactivity and flammability hazards associated with a material as defined by the NFPA reactivity and flammability ratings N R and N F . The flammability rating is further related to the materials flash point temperature and boiling point temperature. 2. A general process hazards factor -F 1 -which is a measure of reaction characteristics, i.e. exothermal or endothermal, and the facility characteristics, i.e. access, drainage, outdoor or indoor units, and handling or transfer of chemicals. 3. A special process hazards factor -F 2 -which is a measure material characteristics, i.e. toxicity, corrosion, dust, and operations characteristics, i.e. extreme pressures and/or temperatures, temperatures in flammable range, amount of material and special equipment with high fire and explosion potential. These steps -the hazard rating steps -are shown enclosed by a dashed line in figure 1. Fig. 1 Procedure for calculating the Dow F&EI and other risk analysis information. The dash line enclose the procedure for rating the hazards of a process unit, while the dash-dot line enclose the procedure for calculating the management risk information. This paper proposes a risk index as an alternative to the management risk information.
The F&EI is simply the product of these 3 factors, i.e. F&EI = MF * F 1 * F 2 = MF * F 3
(1)
Based on the value of the index the hazard of a process unit is rated as light, moderate, intermediate, heavy or severe (AIChE, 1994).
Management Information Calculation
The F&EI is simply a number, which rates the hazards of a single process unit. It does not account for any measures taken to prevent or limit a loss due to a fire or an explosion or the value of the equipment within the fire or explosion area. However, the communication to management is in dollar terms, i.e. maximum probable property damage -MPPD, maximum probable days outtage -MPDO -and business interruption loss -BI. These steps -the risk esitmation steps -are shown enclosed by a dash-dot line in the lower part of figure 1 . The estimation of management information based on the F&EI involves several steps. First the area potentially affected by a fire and/or explosion is determined. In simple situations the area can be estimated directly from the index (in SI-units):
Area of Exposure = * (0,3048 * 0,84 * F&EI)
The value of the equipment inside this area is estimated from accounting records or other sources of economic data. Once the value of the equipment inside the exposure area has been determined it can always be expressed as value per unit of area, and then the MPPD is estimated as follows:
Base MPPD = 0,205939 * F&EI 2 * DF * (Value per unit of area)
'Base' indicates that the above expression does not reflect any loss control measures, which may have been implemented on the unit. The parameter DF is the so-called damage factor, which accounts for the actual damage experience at Dow Chemicals based on the material factor and the process unit hazards factor, i.e.
The actual loss control measures implement on a unit is accounted for by multiplying the Base MPPD with a loss control credit factor -LCCF. The LCCF is a product of three loss control credit factors: 1. A process control credit factor -C 1 -which accounts for emergency power, cooling, explosion control, emergency shutdown systems, computer control, inerting, operating instructions/procedures, reactive chemicals review and other forms of process hazards analysis. 2. A material isolation credit factor -C 2 -which accounts for remote control valves, dump and/or blow down systems, drainage systems and interlocks. 3. A fire protection credit factor -C 3 -which accounts for leak detection, structural steel protection, fire water supply and availability, special systems, sprinkler systems, water curtains, foam systems, hand extinguishers and cable protection systems.
The loss control credit factor is the product of these three factors:
The actions behind this factor reduces the severity of a fire or explosion event, and therefore it reduces the maximum probable property damage, so the actual value is given by Actual MPPD = LCCF * Base MPPD (
The MPDO is calculated directly from the Actual MPPD using a correlation in the F&EI Guide. Finally are the business interruption loss calculated by multiplying by the value of production for a day and a factor representing fixed cost and profits. During preliminary design accounting information may not be readily available. However, there still is a need to estimate the business risk and compare the level of risk with existing or other company facilities. A modification of the management calculation procedure to calculate a risk index in stead of losses in financial terms would accomplish this. Offset F&EI = LCCF 0.5 * F&EI (7) which has the same Actual MPPD as the original F&EI, and hence also the same values of the other management information items, i.e. MPDO and BI. However, Gupta et.al (2003) in their interpretation ignore the difference between hazard, as rated by the F&EI value, and risk, as measured by the management information, i.e. maximum probable process damage (MPPD), maximum probable days outtage (MPDO) and business interruption loss (BI). This can lead to incorrect use and analysis, when using the 'Offset F&EI'. For example loss control measures, such a process control computer or remote control valves or foam systems, can make a plant safer, but they may fail. Hence, their presence does not make the plant inherently safer or change its hazard level. These measures only change risk of a fire and/or explosion. It would therefore not be good engineering practice to reduce the layout spacing because of a process control computer in the control room. In the event of a fire and/or explosion the process control computer is not limiting the area impacted by that fire and/or explosion. Therefore credit cannot be taken for the process control computer or any other loss control measures when using the F&EI to calculate equipment spacing in plant layout, as in the equation for radius of exposure fire or explosion exposure (1994)
Previous Work on Modifying the F&EI
A plant layout, which minimize the loss from fires and explosion will attempt to space equipment, so the exposure areas defined by the above radius does not overlap, and hence a fire or explosion in one process unit does not have a domino effect on a nearby unit. The interpretation of the radius of exposure or area of exposure calculated from the Offset F&EI using the same multiplication factor as in the F&EI Guide, i.e. 0.256 (in SI-units), is unclear, as is the replacement value calculated from this area. Unfortunately Gupta et.al (2003) conclude based on 'Offset F&EI', that 'the equipment can be spread out less to save from domino effect', and that 'it implies lesser land requirements' or 'shorter pipe lengths'. Gupta et.al (2003) also state 'the loss control measures are installed to reduce the hazard potential of a process'. Loss control measures are taken to reduce the risk, i.e. likely losses as indicated by MPPD, MPDO or BI. The hazard may only be reduced by applying the principles of inherent safer design. Neither is it correct to state, that the 'Offset F&EI' makes the system inherently safer. Only system changes, i.e. process design and process route change will make the system inherently safer. The proposed 'Offset F&EI' does however have the following benefit:
• Easier evaluation of cost versus benefit of different loss control measures especially during design and application for a permit from authorities. However, the other advantages claimed by Gupta et.al (2003) , such reduction of the area of exposure and the hazard status of the process unit or reduced insurance premium due to use of a different index or a more compact plant layout or reduced cost of piping or more manageable emergency plans or reduced on-site and off-site consequences, appear not to hold.
Analysis of Damage Factor / Material Factor Relations
The process unit hazards factor, F 3 , is limited to values in the interval from 1 to 8 according to the F&EI Guide. In figure 2 the damage factor is shown as a function of the material factor, which can only assume the discrete values 1, 4, 10, 14, 16, 21, 24, 29 and 40. The process unit hazards factor is an almost continuously variable parameter, which can assume most values in the interval from 1.0 to 8.0. An instructive visualization is therefore to show the damage factor as a function of the process unit hazards factor, F 3 , with the material factor as a parameter, as is done in figure 3 . The parallel lines in figure 3 indicate, that the DF is closely proportional to the material factor. This is confirmed by figure 4, which shows a plot of the DF / MF versus F 3 . For MF > 1 all lines of DF/MF versus process unit hazards factor collapse to a single broad line. This analysis also indicates, that for MF=1 and process unit hazards factor > 2 the damage factor estimation according to the current F&EI Guide deviates from the general trend. This could mean, that the procedure in the current F&EI Guide overestimates the damage factor for a very low material factor and a moderate to high process unit hazards factor. 
with R-squared statistics of 0.64. This rather low R-square value indicates, that this equation does not capture all the information in the original relationship shown in figure 3 . A common approach in risk assessment is to apply a conservative approach. In the case of damage factor, this means selecting largest DF/MF ratio for a given process unit hazards factor. This conservative approach corresponds to the following relationship DF/MF = 0.0174 + 0.00339 * F 3 (10)
However, this approach may overestimate the DF/MF ratio by between 64% and 96% depending on the process unit hazards factor. This overestimation will be carried on to the MPPD, MPDO and BI information, which is not acceptable in evaluation of existing plants. However, during process design, where the goal is to compare the risk of alternative designs the situation may be different, and it may have merit to use the conservative relationship given in equation 10. The overestimation may be avoided by using the actual polynomial relations between DF/MF and F 3 given in appendix A or the relations between DF and F 3 given in appendix B for the different values of MF. This analysis shows, that several possibilities exist for modifying the current relationships between Damage Factor, Material Factor and Process Unit Hazard Factor in the current version of the F&EI Guide to obtain a more smooth graphical representation. The analysis further suggest, that a limiting damage factor -material factor ratio can be defined for a given process unit hazards factor. 
A Conservative MPPD Estimate
Finally account is taken of loss control measures already implemented in the plant or unit through a loss control credit factor -LCCF -which is a product of three loss control credit factors: Actual MPPD = LCCF * 0.205939F&EI 2 * (0.0174*MF+0.00339*F&EI)*(Value/unit area)
Likely Loss Fire & Explosion Index
While in many cases economic data such as construction cost and equipment value per unit area may be available, this is not the case during initial phases of process design. During process design an index, which accounts for the hazards due to the chemicals used and the inventories needed, as well as the risk reduction inherent in loss control measures, such as e.g. a computer process control system, is desired. This section proposes such an index.
The maximum probable property damage is seen from the foregoing analysis to be the following function 
where the coefficient derives from the exposure area calculation in the F&EI guide (AIChE, 1994) . However, since the likely losses after implementation of loss control measures, will be lower than without these measures, it is desired to create a LL-F&EI with the property, that its value is less than or equal to the F&EI. Therefore the following definition is more suitable:
The index defined here is based on the same information as the F&EI, i.e. the material in the plant, MF, and the plant hazards level, F 3 , as well as the loss control measures. This information is generally available during process design, and hence the LL-F&EI may be applied during design to limit risk to acceptable levels. Furthermore, if the damage factor is calculated using the equations in appendix A, then the MPPD, MPDO and BI information may be obtained using the relations in the F&EI Guide. The procedure for calculation of the LL-F&EI is shown in figure 6. For details on the calculation of MPDO and BI from the Actual MPPD the reader is referred to the F&EI Guide. The reactor after a number of years of operation experienced a runaway condition due to overfilling and a malfunctioning relief system. The distillation column has been operated without major problems by students over a twenty year period. 
Using the LL-F&EI

Conclusion
The F&EI Guide is a very carefully written engineering document. Careful analysis of the relationship between process unit hazards factor and material factor on the one side and damage factor on the other side reveal, that the current procedure given in the F&EI Guide could possibly overestimate the damage factor for low material factors and high process unit hazards factors. A plot, which more clearly shows the relationship between the involved quantities has been presented and polynomials regressed to represent the relationships. Other improvements may be possible, and the suggested 'Offset F&EI' (Gupta, 2003) definitely is one way to allow designers to evaluate the impact loss control measures before the plant is build or costed. However, it has been shown, that the analysis of the 'Offset F&EI' by Gupta et.al is incorrect and leads to incorrect conclusions due to the difference between hazard -an inherent property of a facility -and risk -a property which depends on how the facility is operated and maintained. An alternative called the Likely Loss Fire & Explosion Index or LL-F&EI has been proposed in this work. For the LL-F&EI degrees risk similar to the degrees of hazard associated with the F&EI has been defined.
